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This paper studies the extent to which economic crises bust different reactions depending
on individual ideological identity. Our argument is that individual left-right identification
shapes how citizens evaluate the functioning of democracy, and consequently, it
moderates the impact of economic crises on democratic discontent. We argue that
left-wing individuals’ views on democratic performance would be more heavily affected by
economic results and strongly shaped by the (in)capacity of a democracy to represent its
citizens in its reaction to the economic crisis. After testing our argument with data from the
ESS, we provide evidence from a survey experiment conducted in Spain. Both analyses
show that economic crises are relevant in explaining democratic dissatisfaction, but the
strength of their impact depends on ideological identities. Economic results have a
stronger effect on the satisfaction with democracy of left-wing individuals by negatively
affecting their perception of the functioning of democratic representation.
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INTRODUCTION
The European financial crisis, besides being a tsunami for national economies, brought into being
political movements demanding more and better democracy. In response to the economic slump,
governments implemented austerity policies that led in several cases to anti-austerity movements
(Flesher Fominaya 2017). Consequently, what started as an economic crisis evolved to what some
authors have identified as a crisis of political representation (Kriesi 2015). While initially for some
citizens their discontent had its origin in the perceived inefficiency of the political system in
providing economic prosperity, there was widespread contestation against the lack of representation.
This would be particularly relevant in the case of centre and left-wing citizens who found out how the
only recipes to overcome the crisis were, in most cases, severe cuts in social expenditure, labour
market liberalisation and, in short, policies that limited the expansion of the welfare state (Turnbull-
Dugarte and Stuart, 2020). Despite the abundance of literature on how context affects attitudes
towards democracy (Armingeon and Guthmann, 2014: Magalhães, 2014; Cordero and Simón, 2016:
or Christmann and Torcal, 2017 among others), there is a lack of research into why citizens react in
different ways to the same scenario. Here we argue that these different reactions towards the
economic crisis and its impact on satisfaction with democracy are moderated by left-right ideology.
Left-right orientations are not only a widespread political metaphor, they are also a political
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Carmines andD’Amico 2015).While there is ample research into the
relationship between left-right positions and how people vote, the
impact of ideology on attitudes towards democracy has largely been
ignored (Ceka and Magalhaes 2016). Citizens’ ideological self-
placement determines not only their political choices but also, as
put by Jost, Federico, and Napier (2009:324), “a wide range of
attitudes, preferences, judgments, and behaviors”. Therefore, it
should also be expected that left-right orientations are associated
with how attitudes towards the political regime are shaped in reaction
to its context.
Likewise, ideology is the basic template for understanding
events and making political assessments, so it should have an
impact on the dimensions we give more weight to when assessing
the political regime. In this regard, there is empirical evidence
according to which citizens on the right are more willing to accept
social and economic inequality than those on the left (Jost et al.,
2003). As from the last financial crisis less responsive
governments and egalitarian societies emerged, economic
hardship would have more impact on leftist citizens. This
would be the case even for those left-wingers not personally
affected by the economic slump, because the social impact of the
crisis would affect their expectations of and attitudes to the
democratic system. Consequently, we should expect citizens on
different sides of the ideological scale to evaluate their satisfaction
with the political system under different terms.
In this paper we explore this moderating effect of ideology by
looking at satisfaction with democracy (SWD) and reactions to
economic downturns. Satisfaction with democracy is one of the
main attitudinal variables that we should pay attention to in
democratic systems, as it is commonly considered to be a key
measure of regime performance and democratic quality (Morlino
2004). Taking into account what political psychologists have
found about how ideology is associated with individual
happiness (Butz, Kieslich and Bless 2017) and basic values
(Caprara et al., 2006; Piurko, Schwartz and Davidov 2011;
Aspelund et al., 2013), we develop here that rightists’
conservatism and justification of the status quo might be
relevant in levering their democratic discontent. This would
explain why their overall assessment of democracy responds to
changes in the economic context without necessarily questioning
the extent to which the system represents their ideals. Conversely,
left-wing voters have a more representation-driven view of
democracy and they are more willing to demand reforms of
the political system.1 This way, leftists’ satisfaction with
democracy is not only directly affected by economic hardship
but also by how this makes them question whether democratic
systems truly represent their ideals. In this regard, the European
debt crisis should have been a critical moment to leftist parties.
The frugal agenda that was introduced in most countries and
sometimes forced by EU institutions as a way to overcome the
economic slump made them much less useful in the eyes of left-
wing voters in pursuit of policy representation. Consequently,
centre-left- and left-wing citizens would be much more
dissatisfied with the political system as the economic crisis
would have limited their chances of having their preferred
policies implemented (Turnbull-Dugarte and Stuart, 2020).
After assessing the relationship between democratic
discontent, economic distress and individual ideology in
Western Europe with data from the ESS, we provide evidence
from an experiment run in Spain in January 2018. The case of
Spain is relevant to study the impact of economic and political
factors on democratic discontent because it is a country that has
recently experienced both deep economic and political
representation crises (Vidal 2018). Our empirical tests support
our hypothesis of the differential effects of economic hardship on
citizens depending on their ideological identity. Moreover, we
explain that the economic crisis had a major effect on democratic
discontent among the left because it negatively affected their
perception of quality of representation, which in turn
affects SWD.
BACKGROUND
The link between attitudes towards democratic politics and
government performance has attracted the attention of
scholars since the 1970s. The cornerstone of our
understanding of how satisfaction with political regimes -and
more specifically with how democratic systems work-is
rationalized in Easton (1965), Easton (1975). He distinguished
two dimensions: specific and diffuse political support. The former
would be associated to the results achieved by the government
and the political system, and necessarily linked to the (in)capacity
of political institutions to respond to their citizens’ demands. At a
broader level, diffuse support would be related to principles of the
political system. By definition, diffuse support should be more
immune to the outputs of political performance. The literature,
however, has shown that short- and medium-term events such as
economic crises and downturns affect public perceptions of the
functioning of democracy and can affect satisfaction with
democracy and endorsement of the political regime
(Magalhães, 2014; Cordero and Simón, 2016).
A key question, however, is which dimensions of an economic
crisis are more important in explaining satisfaction with
democracy. The dire performance of most Western economies
after the 2008 Great Recession promoted not only widespread
dissatisfaction with economic outcomes, but also growing
discontent towards politics in general and protests against the
political management of the economic system. This indicates that
citizen satisfaction with a regime’s performance will not only
stem from the outcomes achieved, but also on the extent to which
citizens perceive that, due to economic crises, the political values
of the system are respected. If citizens endorse the principles of a
political system, like democracy, their satisfaction with the
political system will be vulnerable to the extent to which
political process is conducted without eroding those principles.
Moreover, in the case of the European financial crisis, the
1This does not rule out that there is also a direct economic effect of the crisis, as life
satisfaction of left-wingers has been shown to be affected by how they perceive
inequality in their societies. This at least would be the case of left-wingers from
European countries, as, according to Alesina, Di Tella, and MacCulloch (2004),
leftists in United States are not so affected by inequality.
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presence of supranational agents and constraints would have
conveyed the idea of an imperfect democracy in which decisions
and policies are not decided by national governments and would
no longer consider their citizens demands (Cordero and Simón,
2016:306; Hobolt and de Vries 2016). This has been analysed by
Devine (2021) who showed that supranational interventions and
a perceived limitation of the autonomy of the domestic political
system is not necessarily associated with a decrease of political
support but the latter is significantly affected by economic
evaluations. Devine’s study, however, focuses on satisfaction
with democracy and trust in the country’s parliament without
considering how different ideological groups might be more
frustrated in a context in which their policy preferences and
ideological predilections are not an option.
To our knowledge, no study to date has analyzed how
individual long-established preferences towards both the
political and the economic system, such as ideology, moderate
the way individuals respond to economic hardship. Our
argument is that the economic slump that began in 2008 had
a major impact on left-wing individuals, on the one hand, because
they were less willing to accept its social consequences and the
austerity measures taken in most countries to overcome the crisis.
On the other, because they are more likely to accept changes to
improve the political system, they are also more demanding in
their assessments of how the system should work. In the next
section we develop this argument and explain how left-right
ideology is a political shortcut that summarizes differing views
towards representation and the role of the national government
in the management of the economy. Consequently, this will shape
the reaction to economic and political factors and their impact on
democratic discontent.
THE ARGUMENT
Satisfaction with democracy (SWD) is not only the result of
citizens’ general evaluation of institutional performance, as it is
also evaluated through the lens of more stable values and
ideology. Why should we assume that the impact of the crisis
on the assessment of economic performance and the quality of
representation is the same for people with different ideological
positions? To our knowledge, the political science literature has
merely highlighted the relationship between SWD and left-right
self-placement (Christmann and Torcal 2017; Anderson and Just
2013) without discussing which factors affect how citizens on the
left (right) side of the scale evaluate the functioning of democracy
differently to those on the right (left).
In a piece of research conducted with data from 20 countries,
Anderson and Singer (2008) found out that an individual’s
political attitudes were differently affected by changes in their
surrounding context depending on their ideological attachments.
They concluded that in countries with high levels of inequality,
left-wing citizens evaluate democracy much more negatively,
whereas right-wing citizens’ attitudes were influenced much
less by income inequality.
More recently, Ceka and Magalhaes, (2016) briefly explored
the way left-right orientations are associated with different
conceptualizations of democracy. They found that those on
the left side of the ideological continuum are more prone than
right-wingers to emphasize social justice and redistribution as key
elements for democracy.
This research makes it clear that an individual’s SWD would
be differently affected by the political and economic contexts
depending on whether they are left-wing or right-wing. In
political psychology, the association between left-right ideology
and certain individual characteristics and political attitudes has
been a main topic since the beginning of the century. Thanks to
recent studies in this field, we know that leftists and rightists differ
not only in their political preferences but also in their basic values
(Piurko et al., 2011) and personality traits (Jost 2006; Caprara and
Vecchione 2018). Considering this, it is reasonable to think that
leftists and rightists have different expectations about the political
system. According to Caprara and Vecchione (2018), studies have
shown that political opinions and preferences of those on the left
tend to be more affected by their concern for other people (self-
transcendence), while those on the right side of the ideological
scale put more weight on values of conservation of the status quo,
this is, resistance to social change and social stability. At the same
time, these values constrain different preferences towards the role
of government and shape opposed ideal societies; while self-
transcendence is associated with social justice, equality and
higher support for civil liberties, conservation relates to free
markets, stability, conformity and tradition (Goren, 2016;
Caprara and Vecchione 2018). This way, in the right we find
the prevalence of their resistance to change and risk aversion over
the prospects of social change (Jost, Federico and Napier 2009:
312). Considering this, it can be expected that right-wing citizens
will be discontented with the political system in case of economic
slump but they would refrain to demand changes as they would
prefer to preserve the political system over the uncertainty that
would convey changing it. Also, because they are more willing to
accept inequality, their assessment of the functioning of
democracy will be less affected by the social consequences of
the crisis as they would find them more acceptable than leftists
citizens. This, in short, would lead to argue that rightists’ SWD is
more resistant to economic slumps. Conversely, the political
cosmovision of the left is sustained by the idea of equality and
equal access to political representation, making them more
reactive to deficiencies in political representation created by
economic hardship, which, in turn, will have a greater impact
on their satisfaction with democracy. This would be in line with
what Ceka and Magalhaes, (2016) found in their research and
what they identified as a more demanding concept of democracy
of those identified as left-wing leftists.
We can further develop this expectation concerning the effects
of the surrounding context on those on the left with regards to the
last financial crisis. The European financial crisis has had a
distinctive impact on the ideological left because, beyond
economic results, the presence of transnational actors and the
accompanying perception of a loss of sovereignty affect citizens’
satisfaction with a political system because this would be seen as
not representative of what citizens demand (Cordero and Simón,
2016; Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2017).
Moreover, the measures taken as a remedy to the economic
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crisis in most countries might be seen as a neo-liberal turn that
was characterized by serious cuts to the welfare state and,
consequently, had a different impact in each ideological group,
left and right, and one might see the crisis as a backlash of the
welfare state, while the other would have seen how their preferred
policies were implemented. Related to this and especially in
countries that were intervened by the EU, left-wing citizens
might see themselves as political orphans as the electoral
choices available would have limited capacity to shape policy
alternatives to the austerity (Turnbull-Dugarte and Stuart, 2020).
Thus, we theorise that the European debt crisis impacts the
satisfaction with democracy of those on the left by damaging
their perceptions of quality of political representation.
In summary, our argument is that left-wing and right-wing
citizens have different expectations pertaining what a democracy
should be, what outcomes it should deliver, how economic crises
affect them and what policies should serve to remedy them. Thus,
their satisfaction with democracy would be shaped by different
factors and economic hardship would more heavily affect the
democratic discontent of those who place themselves on the left
side of the ideological scale. Accordingly, we develop the
following hypothesis:
H1-Economic hardship impacts satisfaction with democracy
of left-wing citizens by eroding more strongly their perceptions of
the quality of political representation.
TESTING OUR HYPOTHESES WITH
OBSERVATIONAL DATA
To analyse the validity of our hypothesis we firstly test it with
observational data from the European Social Survey. As the
political terms left’ and “right” are not so commonly used in
Eastern countries, we use only Western countries in the sample.
In this first part of the analysis, we explore the impact of
economic crisis in Europe on satisfaction with democracy and
other indicators of political satisfaction and the differential
impact of economic outcomes depending on ideology. We use
a sample formed by the first seven rounds of the European Social
Survey, spanning from 2002 to 2014.
Our argument is that ideology moderates the impact of the
economy on satisfaction with democracy. Our main dependent
variable is the standard variable measuring satisfaction with the
political system. This variable is the self-placement in a scale from
0 to 10 to the question “How satisfied are you with the way
democracy works in your country?”, where 0 is extremely
dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied. Secondly, as a
robustness test, we account for the impact of the interaction
between economic performance and ideology on three other
indicators of political trust: trust in politicians, trust in
political parties, and trust in the parliament. These are a basic
indicator of citizens’ support for their political system (Newton
and Norris 2000; Montero, Zmerli and Newton 2008; Devine
2021). The three variables are also measured in a 0 to 10 scale,
where 0 means “no trust at all” and 10 “trust completely”. This
will allow us to tease out the extent to which democratic
discontent due to the crisis runs parallel to the deterioration
of feelings of political representation conditional on ideology. In
the next section, as satisfaction with democracy and with political
representation might be endogenous to each other, we use an
experimental approach that allows us to address issues of
potential endogeneity, as well as any omitted variable bias.
As a measure of ideology, we use the usual individual self-
placement in a left-right scale that ranges from 0 (extreme left) to
10 (extreme right). As measures of economic performance, we use
the two most common measures in the economic voting
literature: annual GDP growth and annual increase in the
unemployment rate.2 These two indicators of the economic
situation are also relevant because citizens often see them as
the result of government’s policies (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier
2000). We focus on the interaction between the left-right self-
placement and these two indicators of economic performance to
assess whether the impact of contextual factors such as the
economic situation on democratic attitudes can be moderated
by individual ideology. Descriptive statistics presented in Table 1
show the range of values that these two variables can take in our
analysis.
Due to the hierarchical structure of the data, we run multilevel
models with varying intercepts by country-waves. This means we
have 108 level-2 units, except for the models on trust in political
parties, where we have 92 level-2 units because the question was
not asked in the first wave of the European Social Survey. In all
models, we include a set of individual-level covariates that allow
us to control that other variables relevant in shaping citizens’
attitudes are affecting our results. In this regard, we build on the
work by Christmann and Torcal (2017) and include the same
covariates they use to replicate their models. Specifically, the
models include a dummy for gender that takes value “1”when the
respondent is a male and “0” for female. We have mixed
expectations with regards to the impact of gender. Although
Hansen and Goenaga (2021) find that women are less satisfied
with democracy, Bol et al. (2021) show that women were more
satisfied with government during the recent COVID-19
lockdown. Models also control for age -as older people tend to
be more satisfied with democracy (Dahlberg et al., 2015)- and
education-as educated citizens tend to be more dissatisfied
(Norris 1999). The former is coded as (coded as how many
years old the respondent is and the variable of education
measures the number of years that the respondent has been
enrolled in an education programme. We also include as
Christmann and Torcal (2017) a variable for marital status
that takes value 1 if the respondent is married and a variable
that captures the most vulnerable occupational status, this is,
whether the individual is unemployed (1) or not (0), as those
worse off will tend to be less satisfied with how the democratic
system is working. Finally, we add a variable on satisfaction with
the government, measured in a 0–10 scale, to account for the fact
that voters’ assessment of democracy in the country is
endogenous to whether a preferred party is in government and
2Data on the GDP growth and changes in the unemployment rate by country and
wave included in the analysis can be found in Supplementary Table S1 in the
Appendix.
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whether voters perceive themselves as losers or winners in the
political system (Anderson and Guillory 1997).
Table 2 displays the results for economic growth. Before
getting to our main variables of analysis, we can comment on
our control variables. We find, consistent with Bol et al. (2021),
that male respondents are more dissatisfied with democracy. The
coefficients of age and education years are contrary to our
expectations. However, in alternative models we explore
whether the effects are not linear. When modelled in a
curvilinear fashion, we do find that the oldest are more
satisfied with democracy and the most educated are more
dissatisfied.
The first models run the analysis without the interaction. The
last four (Models 2.5 to 2–8) include the interaction between
ideology and GDP growth. In the first set of models it is perhaps
surprising that we tend to find not significant effects of the
economy on satisfaction with democracy and the three
political trust measures. This is basically because the variable
satisfaction with the government absorbs all its impact.3
The introduction of the interaction between the GDP growth
and ideology allows us to assess the differential impact of the
financial crisis for citizens with different ideologies. Importantly,
and as expected, the interaction shows that as a result of the
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics.
N Mean St. Dev Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Satisfaction with democracy 178,425 5.739 2.366 0 4 8 10
Trust in politicians 179,407 3.999 2.305 0 2 6 10
Trust in parties 152,577 3.972 2.280 0 2 6 10
Trust in parliament 178,236 4.954 2.418 0 3 7 10
Ideology 179,407 5.045 2.095 0 4 6 10
Gdp growth 179,407 1.104 2.138 −6.30 −0.15 2.07 8.01
Increase in unemployment 179,407 0.207 0.967 −2.29 −0.38 0.60 3.94
Education 179,407 12.528 4.276 0 10 15 56
Unemployed 179,407 0.058 0.233 0 0 0 1
Gender 179,407 1.510 0.500 1 1 2 2
Age 179,407 48.284 18.145 14 34 62 123
Married 179,407 0.507 0.500 0 0 1 1
Satisfaction with government 179,407 4.515 2.390 0 3 6 10
TABLE 2 | Effect of ideology conditional on GDP growth on satisfaction with democracy and political trust. Multi-level models.





















Ideology 0.0141*** −0.00379* −0.00643*** −0.0118*** 0.0180*** 0.00113 −0.000144 −0.00596**
(0.00209) (0.00210) (0.00224) (0.00227) (0.00231) (0.00232) (0.00248) (0.00249)
GDP growth 0.0151 0.0365 0.0304 0.0498* 0.0342 0.0609*** 0.0616*** 0.0784***
(0.0227) (0.0226) (0.0203) (0.0255) (0.0233) (0.0231) (0.0209) (0.0260)
Interaction — — — — −0.00374*** −0.00478*** −0.00610*** −0.00560***
— — — — (0.000964) (0.000968) (0.00103) (0.000991)
Education 0.0337*** 0.0314*** 0.0623*** 0.0186*** 0.0338*** 0.0314*** 0.0623*** 0.0186***
(0.00110) (0.00110) (0.00118) (0.00119) (0.00110) (0.00110) (0.00118) (0.00119)
Unemployed −0.263*** −0.140*** −0.235*** −0.120*** −0.263*** −0.139*** −0.235*** −0.120***
(0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0199) (0.0199)
Gender −0.146*** 0.0528*** −0.139*** 0.0212** −0.146*** 0.0529*** −0.139*** 0.0212**
(0.00853) (0.00857) (0.00915) (0.00929) (0.00853) (0.00857) (0.00914) (0.00929)
Age −0.00121*** 0.000978*** −0.000779*** −0.00207*** −0.00120*** 0.000985*** −0.000772*** −0.00206***
(0.000258) (0.000259) (0.000277) (0.000280) (0.000258) (0.000259) (0.000277) (0.000280)
Married 0.0575*** 0.00919 0.0447*** −0.0470*** 0.0576*** 0.00930 0.0449*** −0.0469***
(0.00905) (0.00908) (0.00969) (0.00984) (0.00905) (0.00908) (0.00969) (0.00984)
Satisfaction with
government
0.548*** 0.500*** 0.521*** 0.462*** 0.548*** 0.500*** 0.522*** 0.463***
(0.00200) (0.00201) (0.00214) (0.00218) (0.00200) (0.00201) (0.00214) (0.00218)
Observations 178,425 179,407 178,236 152,577 178,425 179,407 178,236 152,577
Level-2 Units 108 108 108 92 108 108 108 92
Constant and Country and wave varying intercepts not shown. Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
3In the Appendix (Supplementary Tables S2, 3) we replicate these models without
including the variable on satisfaction with the government and we can observe that
the economic variables have the expected significant impact with the expected sign.
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financial crisis, left-wing voters reduce more their satisfaction
with democracy than right wing voters (model 2.5). The negative
and significant sign in the interaction indicates that when GDP
increases, the increase in satisfaction with democracy will be
lower for right wing individuals. This already tells us that left-
wing voters’ assessment of the political system will be more
conditional on the state of the economy. To account for the
magnitude of these effects, in Figure 1 we simulate the impact of
the economy on satisfaction with democracy for voters with
different ideological profiles. It can be observed, more
specifically, that when the economy is doing well, the
predicted satisfaction with democracy of a left-wing and a
right-wing individual are virtually the same.4 However, once
there is an economic slump, the satisfaction with democracy
of a left-wing voter will significantly deteriorate more than a right
wing voter’s. The magnitude of the effects is not large, which
indicates that an attitudinal variable such as satisfaction with
democracy is possibly explained by many other underlying
attitudinal cofounders, but it runs in the expected direction.
This result is reinforced in models 2.6 to 2.8. where we use as
dependent variable the three different political trust variables, we
find the same results. Economic crises erode more strongly trust
in different dimensions of the political system if the voter has a
left-wing ideology. The positive sign of the interaction shows that
the reduction in political trust is less strong as the individual has a
more right-wing ideology.
As a robustness check, in Table 3we replicate the samemodels
with the same sample, but introducing increase in unemployment
as a measure of economic performance. The expected signs are
now the opposite as now higher values of the economic
performance variable mean worse economic results (larger
increases in unemployment). The results are consistent with
the previous models. Increases in unemployment reduce
satisfaction with democracy as well as political trust. However,
as the interaction in models 3.5–3.8 shows, the negative effect of
economic performance is weaker for right wing voters (and
stronger for left-wing individuals).
In summary, we find results consistent with our theoretical
approach. Economic crises reduce levels of satisfaction with
democracy for all citizens. However, its effect is more negative
and significant for left-wing individuals. This is consistent across
the three indicators of political trust: trust in political parties,
parliaments or politicians. The impact of the crisis on satisfaction
with democracy operates more strongly in left-wing individuals.
FIGURE 1 | Predicted satisfaction with democracy by ideology and economic growth. Note: 95% confidence intervals.
4This simulation comes from a model with country and wave fixed effects where
economic slumps and high economic growth are −3 and 3% rates. Left-wing
individuals score 1 in the ideological scale and right wing individuals score 9 in the
ideological scale.
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However, whether these differences between ideological groups
are the result of the deterioration of perceptions of the quality of
political representation must be tested with a different approach.
To provide more evidence of our proposed mechanism we run a
survey experiment in the next section.
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
We have argued that left-wing voters will place more importance
on political representation as a trait of democracies. The previous
results support with observational evidence our argument about
the differential impact of the failure of the economic system on
citizens’ SWD and political trust depending on their ideology.
The economic crisis, however, was not only seen as a period of
economic hardship. Particularly in Southern Europe, the
economic crisis has generated a strong dissatisfaction with
political representation. As Armingeon et al. (2015) argue,
citizens’ perceptions about the quality of representation have
been eroded as a result of the economic crisis, especially where the
response to the crisis was mostly based on austerity and where
Eurozone constraints did not allow national governments to
define the way they wanted to address the crisis. Also, we
have also emphasized that in some countries, especially in
those whose economies were intervened by the EU as is the
case of Spain, left-wing citizens might have felt politically orphan
because the parties that should have represented the policy
alternatives to the austerity measures prioritized being
responsible in the EU’s eyes (Turnbull-Dugarte and Stuart,
2020). Thus, we also test this argument with data from a
survey experiment conducted with an online sample in Spain
and fielded by Netquest during the last week of January 2018.
The Spanish case is particularly useful for our purposes. On
the one hand, despite the fact of the Spanish democracy was born
after a 4 decades dictatorship, there are no reasons to think the
values and issues associated to the left and to the right in Spain are
significantly different to those associated to each ideological side
in other West European democracies (Caprara and Vecchione
2018). Also, and to the purposes of this research, Spain is a
country where the economic crisis has had a very strong impact.
More importantly, the crisis showed that the economic model in
Spain was very sensitive to the economic cycle as the country
transitioned from a period of economic expansion and job
creation to economic recession and the second highest
unemployment rate in the European Union in a dramatically
short period of time. This will allow us to test the sensitivity of
different types of individuals to the economic crisis and its impact
on their satisfaction with democracy. In addition, Spain is
relevant for studying the impact of the crisis on the perception
of flawed political representation. Spain was one of the countries
that received a bail-out (in the Spanish case just for the banking
system) and where policy-making was restricted firstly, during
the leftist government leaded by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero
and also later under Mariano Rajoy’s conservative executive. In
the case of Spain, the collective Democracia real, Ya (in English,
“Real democracy, now”) was part of the nucleus of the Indignado5
TABLE 3 | Effect of ideology conditional on unemployment increase on satisfaction with democracy and political trust. Multi-level models.





















Ideology 0.0146*** −0.00372* −0.0121*** −0.00607*** 0.0128*** −0.00714*** −0.0159*** −0.0101***
(0.00209) (0.00210) (0.00227) (0.00224) (0.00214) (0.00215) (0.00231) (0.00229)
Incr unemployment −0.0350 −0.0911* −0.114** −0.0684 −0.0725 −0.164*** −0.200*** −0.155***
(0.0499) (0.0493) (0.0555) (0.0444) (0.0509) (0.0503) (0.0564) (0.0458)
Interaction — — — — 0.00768*** 0.0148*** 0.0175*** 0.0177***
— — — — (0.00202) (0.00203) (0.00206) (0.00218)
Education 0.0342*** 0.0315*** 0.0182*** 0.0626*** 0.0342*** 0.0315*** 0.0182*** 0.0626***
(0.00110) (0.00110) (0.00119) (0.00118) (0.00110) (0.00110) (0.00118) (0.00118)
Unemployed −0.269*** −0.141*** −0.115*** −0.239*** −0.268*** −0.140*** −0.114*** −0.238***
(0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0199) (0.0199)
Gender −0.148*** 0.0525*** 0.0231** −0.141*** −0.148*** 0.0519*** 0.0224** −0.141***
(0.00853) (0.00856) (0.00928) (0.00914) (0.00853) (0.00856) (0.00928) (0.00914)
Age −0.000767*** 0.00105*** −0.00244*** −0.000440* −0.000768*** 0.00104*** −0.00244*** −0.000443*
(0.000249) (0.000250) (0.000269) (0.000267) (0.000249) (0.000250) (0.000269) (0.000267)
Married 0.548*** 0.500*** 0.462*** 0.521*** 0.549*** 0.500*** 0.463*** 0.522***
(0.00200) (0.00200) (0.00218) (0.00214) (0.00200) (0.00201) (0.00218) (0.00214)
Satisfaction with government — — — — — — — —
178,425 179,407 152,577 178,236 178,425 179,407 152,577 178,236
108 108 92 108 108 108 92 108
Observations 178,425 179,407 178,236 152,577 178,425 179,407 178,236 152,577
Level-2 Units 108 108 108 92 108 108 108 92
Constant and Country and wave varying intercepts not shown. Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
5The name “Indignados” was inspired by Stephane Hessel’s essay “Time for
Outrage: Indignez-vous!”
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movement that rallied on the streets under the motto “They do
not represent us.”6 This movement, mostly composed of left-
wingers, could be understood as a natural response to the severe
economic crisis in Spain. However, it is worth noting that most of
the criticism which emanated from the indignados was against
political institutions and how they were no longer able to
represent the demands of ordinary citizens. As a result of the
crisis, both Prime Minister Zapatero and Rajoy had to abandon
their electoral pledges and implement policies imposed by the
European institutions. Citizens’ contestation though was about
flawed political representation and not just the economic
outcomes of the crisis. Moreover, because the outbreak of
Spanish protest took place under a socialist government, this
movement should not be seen as the reaction of the political
losers. The source of this democratic discontent could be
considered to be rather ideological than partisan.
Our experiment had a sample of 1,200 individuals and
respondents were divided into two groups (n  600 in each
group). Respondents were sampled using quotas by gender, age
and region (Autonomous Community). All respondents had to
answer to what extent they agreed (on a five point scale:
completely agree, to some extent agree, neither agree nor
disagree, somehow disagree, completely disagree) with two
statements about the political situation and two more about
the economy. The two statements associated with the political
situation were: “Political parties do not represent me” and
“Political reforms are necessary”. The two related to the
economy were “Economic reforms are necessary” and “The
economic system benefits those with power”. As the
distribution of the responses is not linear, we recoded the
answers to create a dummy variable that takes value “1” when
the respondent completely or to some extent agrees with the
statement and “0” when s/he neither agrees nor disagrees,
somehow disagrees or completely disagrees.
Importantly, all these beliefs have an impact on satisfaction
with democracy. We tested whether having perceptions of both a
failed economic system and a deteriorated political representation
diminishes satisfaction.We run successive OLS regressions where
satisfaction with democracy is our dependent variable and the
agreement with these statements are the explanatory variables. As
shown in Figure 2, agreement with the statement in all four cases
correlates significantly with lower levels of satisfaction with
democracy.
Thus, the question now is whether economic hardship affects
these perceptions and if so whether it does so differently for right-
wing and left-wing citizens. In order to test this, the control group
was asked to answer to what extent they agreed with four further
statements, while the treatment group was exposed to a framing
experiment. Before answering the same four statements, they
were asked to think about the last 10 years and the economic
crisis. The aim behind this strategy is to assess whether citizens
establish links between these statements and the consequences of
the economic crisis. Our goal is twofold. On the one hand, we
intent to address how citizens understand and interpret the
economic crisis, as well as the extent to which they link it to
economic and/or political factors. On the other, we want to see if
this understanding of the crisis differs across political ideologies.
The wording of the treatments and dependent variables in this
case were as follows:
Control Group. To what extent do you agree with the following
statements? (Completely agree, to some extent agree, neither agree
nor disagree, somehow disagree, completely disagree)
Treatment Group. Thinking about the last 10 years and the
economic crisis, to what extent do you agree with the following
statements? (Completely agree, to some extent agree, neither
agree nor disagree, somehow disagree, completely disagree).
Percentages of agreement with each of the aforementioned
assessments (recoded into dummy variables) differ by citizens’
ideology (see Table 4). In addition, and more importantly, the
agreement with the statements also changes when citizens are
exposed to the framing treatment and think in terms of the
financial crisis and the last 10 years.
It is worth mentioning the differences between left-wing and
right-wing citizens in the control group concerning the extent to
which political parties represent them. While the degree of
agreement with the statements about economic problems, for
instance, is basically similar for leftist and right-wing voters, the
two political statements receive more endorsement from left-
wing voters. This already indicates that political dissatisfaction
seems to be larger among left-wing voters, confirming our
previous descriptive evidence that left-wing voters are more
demanding in terms of the role that political representation
plays in a democracy.
FIGURE 2 | Effect of perceptions of quality of the political and economic
systems on satisfaction with democracy. Note: The figure displays the
regression coefficients of the four statements on satisfaction with democracy
(95% confidence interval).
6Original in Spanish is “No nos representan”.
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When the economic crisis is mentioned, we see that
agreement with the two statements about the political side
of the crisis (political parties do not represent me and political
reforms are necessary) increases mostly among left-wing
voters, while it increases less (or even decreases) for right-
wing citizens. This, somehow, indicates a different view of the
TABLE 4 | Percentages of agreement/disagreement by ideology and treatment group.
Political parties do not represent me
Left-wing citizens Right-wing citizens
Disagree (%) Agree (%) Disagree (%) Agree (%)
Control group 27.4 72.6 42.6 57.3
Economic treatment 21,1 79.9 39.5 60.4
Political reforms are necessary
Left-wing citizens Right-wing citizens
Disagree (%) Agree (%) Disagree (%) Agree (%)
Control group 3 97 1.7 98.3
Economic treatment 1.1 98.9 6.9 93.1
Economic reforms are necessary
Left-wing citizens Right-wing citizens
Disagree (%) Agree (%) Disagree (%) Agree (%)
Control group 2.7 97.3 6 94
Economic treatment 4.5 95.5 3 97
The economic system benefits those with power
Left-wing citizens Right-wing citizens
Disagree (%) Agree (%) Disagree (%) Agree (%)
Control group 6.1 93.9 30.1 69.9
Economic treatment 3.7 96.3 25.2 74.8
FIGURE 3 | Marginal effect of treatment by ideology (continuous variable) on agreement with statements “Political parties do not represent me” and “Political reforms are
needed.”Note:Modelswith covariates (90%confidence intervals). Estimates are based on the first and second logistic regressionmodels presented inTableS.4. in theAppendix.
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economic crisis or invites us to think that individuals might
understand the economic crisis to have different origins and
solutions depending on their ideological identity. Thus, for
citizens on the left the crisis might not be all about the
economy, but instead they feel that the political side of it (and
particularly political representation) are intimately related to the
last 10 years of economic hardship and the slow recovery. We do
not see, however, differential effects across ideological types for the
two economic statements. Both left- and right-wing voters make a
similar link between the economic crisis and economic statements.
To see whether these differences remain in a multivariate
analysis, we ran logistic regression models including as control
variables gender, age, education and occupational status. Our
dependent variables are each of the dummy variables for each
of the four statements. In Figure 3 we display the treatment
effects conditional on ideology for the two statements related
to political representation and in Figure 4 the effects for the
two statements related to the economic measures.7
Concerning the agreement with the statement “Political parties
do not represent me”, the marginal effect of the treatment in
comparison to the control group by ideology is shown in
Figure 3. As seen those on the left are more prone to say they
do not feel represented by political parties when the economic
crisis is mentioned. However, the effect is not so clear for citizens
on the right. For right-wingers there might be no significant
differences between control and treatment groups. These results
are on a 90 per cent level confidence, though. Differences between
leftists and rightists are more evident concerning the statement
“Political reforms are needed”. As seen in the right-hand panel,
not only the magnitude of the effects is higher, the effect of the
treatment has a steeper slope when respondents’ ideological
position moves from left to right which points to a clear
division between left and right in what respects to their
preferences towards the political system.8
On the other hand, the level of agreement with the statements
about the economy, displayed in Figure 4 seems not to be affected
by the treatment or at least the evidence is not as revealing as with
the political statements. Although the effect moves in the opposite
direction to that of the political system statements, we do not
observe that right-wing individuals significantly change their
perception of the quality of the economic system as compared
to left-wing citizens.
With these results we can state that priming respondents with
statements about the economic crisis has an effect on perceptions
of the quality of representation, but this effect differs depending
on a citizen’s ideology. Thus, when the economic crisis is
mentioned, those on the left are more critical of politics and
are more willing to agree with statements about the lack of
representation and the necessity of political reforms. This
behaviour is different to that of those on the right side of the
ideological scale whose assessments on the quality of
representation would not be linked to the economic crisis.
This gives support to our hypothesis and suggests that our
FIGURE 4 | Marginal effect of treatment by ideology (continuous variable) on agreement with statements “Economic reforms are needed” and “The economic
system only favors the powerful.” Note: Models with covariates (90% confidence intervals). Estimates are based on the third and fourth logistic regression models
presented in Table A.4. in the Appendix.
7See Supplementary Table S4 in the Appendix for the full results in a table.
8We have also tested in a different experiment for a direct effect of the political
representation crisis on satisfaction with democracy, but we do not find any
differential impact according to ideology. Thus, we only have evidence of it as being
a mediator of the effect of economic crises by negatively affecting perceptions of
political representation of left-wing people.
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suggested mechanism is correct. The impact of the economic
crisis on perceptions of democratic representation is more salient
within the left. This means that not only, as we previously
showed, do left-wingers tend to be more dissatisfied with
democracy than those on the right, but also this discontent is
the result of a more demanding concept of democracy in which
economic crisis leads to a re-assessment of the political system.
Altogether, the experiment provides evidence on how the
mechanisms by which economic crises decrease the general
satisfaction with democracy have a different intensity
contingent on individuals’ ideology. While there are no
differential perceptions of the economic dimension of
economic crises for left- and right-wing individuals, economic
crises do affect more strongly left-wing citizen’s perception of
democratic representation. These results shed light on the sharp
decrease in democratic satisfaction that most European countries
have suffered in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The crisis hit
both sides of the political spectrum, but the way it has impacted
citizens is different according to their ideology.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we argued that, as the literature has traditionally
stated, economic hardship has a negative impact on citizens’
satisfaction with democracy. However, we have shown that the
mechanism by which their satisfaction with democracy decreases
differs depending on their ideology. The reason is that
individuals’ ideology defines different conceptions of
democracy. Right-wing citizens give more weight to their
resistance to change and risk aversion, while left-wing citizens
place more importance on the political representation dimension.
As a result, economic hardships affect more left-wingers’
satisfaction with the political system by negatively affecting
their perception of democratic representation.
This research can be expanded in the future in several ways.
First, we have shown that ideology is relevant when defining
which dimensions of democracy citizens consider fundamental.
In other words, ideology correlates with distinct conceptions of
what a democracy is and what it should achieve. Research on
this topic, however, has been surprisingly scant. Further
research exploring more systematically whether citizens have
different perceptions of what a democracy is and what they
expect from could help illuminate why left and right also differ
in what they await from the political system. Secondly, we have
shown how citizens in Spain, more in particular those on the left
of the ideological scale, link the 2008 Great Recession with the
erosion of democratic representation. To better assess the
implications of the crisis, it would be necessary to evaluate
whether the deterioration of democratic representation is just a
short-term effect or whether the legacy of the crisis is a change in
the perception of the extent to which democratic systems are
able to represent citizens’ political demands. Finally, we studied
the effects of economic hardship on satisfaction with democracy
by using experimental evidence from Spain. We argue that the
Spanish case is very suitable as it is a country where both the
economic and political crises have been very pronounced and
where citizens established clear links between them both.
However, we are aware of the limitations of focusing on such
a specific context and cross-country research with more
countries in which the economic crisis has affected the
economy will contribute to a better understanding of the
association between economic results, perceptions of
democratic representation and evaluations of the political
regime.
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